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SCIENCE AND THE LAW*
WILLIAM J. MCGILLt

It is a great honor for me to have been invited here this evening at the
outset of the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the Guild of Catholic
Lawyers of the Archdiocese of New York. The time appears also to coincide
with the 500th anniversary of the birth of Saint Thomas More, the remarkably courageous Lord Chancellor of England whose resistance to the Act
of Supremacy separating the English Church from Rome, and whose ultimate martyrdom at the hand of Henry VIII, have made him the patron
saint of lawyers. It is easy to feel intimidated by both the historical setting
and the professional competence of this distinguished audience.
My only serious legal qualification to address you is the fact that
during the nearly 8 years in which I have served as President of Columbia
University, I have been sued and investigated repeatedly for attempting
to carry out the duties which the Trustees assigned to me. I cannot claim
to be overscrupulous, but I would also never consider crossing the street
against a red light. I do not smoke, although my wife does. And when she
opens a pack of cigarettes, I see to it always that she tears the tax stamp.
I drive our automobile very carefully, never exceeding the speed limit, and
would certainly consider it unthinkable to violate the 8-foot law. Yet the
events of the last 10 years in California and in New York have managed
to lose for me the status I once enjoyed as an untarnished legal virgin. I
have found myself on the receiving end of more than a hundred lawsuits
and at least one state legislative investigation. It is perhaps indicative of
the current conditions of life for university presidents that I find myself
casting an eye warily around the room searching for problems beyond those
of which I am already aware. I see at least a dozen familiar faces, distinguished attorneys with whom I have been recently involved, or perhaps the
correct word is embroiled. Out of respect for the rules of the Marquess of
Queensberry, no one has served a legal paper on me this evening-at least
not yet!
Seriously, I want to speak to you this evening about the increasingly
adversary character of American public life as it affects the administration
of science. It is not quite true that all of us are threatening to sue the pants
off each other or to investigate the daylights out of one another, but it is
also not ludicrously false either. In the years since World War II, the mass
media in the United States has greatly enhanced our nation's almost un* Address delivered to The Guild of Catholic Lawyers of the Archdiocese of New York,
September 20, 1977.
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limited capacity for disputatiousness. Of course, this is not a new problem.
Conflict is what sells newspapers, and more than 70 years ago Roscoe
Pound called attention to America's unusual legal contentiousness in a
remarkable paper on the causes of popular dissatisfaction with the administration of justice. Nevertheless, in view of the conflict-oriented style of
our mass media, and present day judicial standards for redressing grievances, we seem to be moving toward a more distilled form of purely adversary society than even Dean Pound foresaw.
The emerging social order in America may well be one in which policy
at all levels is forged from the clash of narrowly based constituency interests, each one at war for its own special advantage without regard for the
others or for the larger public interest. American visitors to the People's
Republic of*China have commented on the striking differences between
modern China and modern America in this respect. China is well organized
and harmonious, displaying a universal popular dedication to the growth
of its brand of rigorous Marxism, whereas the United States carries on its
business in a continuing swirl of investigations, legal actions, inflated rhetoric, criticism in the newspapers, and other pressures.
I certainly do not want to be naive about this problem. The subtleties
of another culture are easily misunderstood. Moreover, it is not immediately evident that harmony achieved by suppression of dissent is preferable
to the hurly-burly of American public life. Dispute is a trivial price to pay
for the benefits of a free society, but frankly I am worried about the effects
of these psychological stresses on our people. A deepening cynicism and
almost paranoid mistrust of established institutions appear to have
gripped the American people in the aftermath of the Vietnam War and the
Watergate scandals. Fortunately, the courts have emerged from this troubled period with enhanced respect. But the number of conflicts which the
legal profession and our courts are now expected to resolve has also increased geometrically, raising serious doubts about the capacity of our
legal system to deal effectively with public discord on the scale projected
by the recent growth of adversary conflict in the United States.
I hope I will not be misunderstood if I say that these developments
seem to me to have occurred in direct proportion to the willingness of the
courts to intervene in the operation of our society's institutions. We live
in an era of extraordinary judicial activism in which the courts have shown
themselves quite prepared to administer schools, prison systems, state
police organizations, municipal services, and many other institutional activities, if such intervention is deemed necessary to achieve compliance
with their orders. It may indeed be necessary. And legislatures have shown
no alarm about this remarkable expansion of judicial power. Indeed, they
have encouraged it, and have themselves produced a burgeoning regulatory
apparatus performing quasi-judicial functions even more interventionist
than our courts. Americans are, above all, impatient. Consequently, our
legal system seems to prefer social change by direct intervention in'the
functioning of businesses, schools, local government, and other institutions
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rather than through the patient application of correctives or incentives.
We ought to think more seriously about such developments. Although
legal contentiousness is an old problem in the United States, large scale
judicial intervention is of fairly recent origin. There is now a substantive
basis for complaint by the business sector that the interventionist bent of
the courts and the government is making it increasingly difficult to form
capital and thus is unwittingly, but effectively, altering the nature of our
economic system. Similarly, there is a growing basis for complaint by the
institutional nonprofit sector of society-schools, colleges, hospitals,
churches, and social agencies-to the effect that the interventionist bent
of the courts and the regulatory agencies has so embroiled these institutions in community struggle that our traditional commitments to intellectual and moral excellence have had to be suppressed in order to meet the
priorities of peacemaking.
I do not rise before you this evening merely to express the frustrations
that every chief administrator of a major American university feels in
attempting to guide his own institution safely through this Darwinian embroglio. When we alter the power relations in society, frustrations must be
expected. Institutions cannot continue to operate in their traditional easy
ways when profound changes are occurring in American life. The power
relations among the components of society have been altered to an astonishing extent, and there will be no ease for those who carry administrative
responsibility. The point of my initial argument is that I do not accept the
view of many lawyers and judges with whom I have discussed this problem;
that they are more or less passive observers of society's disputes and that
all this is part of the history and sociology of our time.
There is no doubt in my mind that a causal relationship exists between the willingness of the courts to review the decisions of university
administrators and the development of new legislation attempting to influence the outcome of such review, and that both these factors tend to
increase the number of disputes at universities that eventually find their
way into court. It appears to me that the social process by which this causal
sequence occurs is obvious, and courts and legislatures should not deceive
themselves about the consequences of their activism. They are shapers of
society, not passive arbiters.
The difficulties I am describing are, in part, the growing pains of a
vigorous and creative free people. Repression of dissent and rigorous planning are as foreign to the dramatics of current American life as they seem
to be natural in the Marxist states. It is plausible to argue that legislative
and judicial interventionism in the United States has prevented the growth
of revolutionary forces by giving voice to segments of our society previously
excluded from decision-making. I happen to believe that, but I am also
charged with the guidance of one of the great educational institutions of
the world, and I have to tell you that the character of the community
struggles in which I find myself continuously enmeshed makes me wonder
how in the world we ever make sensible educational decisions. It is a
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question of balance and proportion. In recent years, the balance has been
struck in such a way as to involve us regularly with militant advocacy
groups which object to our educational activities and. move quite effectively to influence them.
It is plain that this adversary pushing and shoving may be either good
or bad depending on the nature of the dangers which our centers of thought
and research pose to society as well as on the extremely subtle question of
what the first concerns of a university ought to be. If, in the long run, this
turbulent era is seen as strengthening America by broadening the base of
our democracy, increasing our respect for law, and preventing social harm,
then the frustrations which we university administrators now endure will
have been well worth it. On the other hand, it is not difficult to argue that
we are weakening America's scientific leadership by unwittingly establishing the principle that the conflicting advocacy of the legislature or the
courtroom is the best way to develop sound public policy in science and
technology. I want to develop this point with you briefly this evening, and
I want to counsel forbearance.
In many parts of the country, a serious town-gown struggle is developing between universities and their surrounding communities over research
on recombinant DNA. The basic knowledge and biochemical technology
have been developed by which scientists can combine segments of genetic
material from different molecules. Thus, DNA molecules that are not
known to exist in nature can be generated in the laboratory. These new
research techniques also make it possible to transfer laboratory-generated
genetic material to host cells where it seems to be able to replicate itself
and actually to function. An immensely powerful research tool has thus
been created, offering untold possibilities for understanding the nature of
life processes and for the production of desirable biological substances such
as scarce hormones. It also presents the possibility of inadvertently creating biological hazards. One of the methods involves the introduction of
foreign genes into known viruses. A potentially lethal virus might be created, raising the spectre of the escape of an artificially generated, uncontrollable disease. Biologists acknowledge that it is not possible to give
absolute assurances on this dangerous outcome, but they rate the probability as vanishingly small if the research is properly administered and carried out by qualified individuals. The overwhelming majority of biologists
believe that the research must be undertaken because it is the avenue to
new basic knowledge. The human race cannot protect itself by hiding from
discovery. Most biologists are certain that the risks are controllable. They
themselves proposed the safety standards now enforced by the National
Institutes of Health to deal with biohazards. All this was accomplished
before the general public had become aware of the nature of the problem.
The biological research community performed a notable public service in
seeking to develop public awareness and understanding of the biohazards
associated with research on DNA. But the discussion has begun to cause
strong apprehensions among well-educated and intelligent representatives
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of the general public. Serious efforts to suppress the research are now being
undertaken by opponents who fear some form of permanent damage to the
human race.
One of the most attractive aspects of the era in which we live is the
great public concern for the preservation of our natural environment. This
concern has manifested itself in a veritable maze of statutory and regulatory constraints on industrial technology. No industrial process in the
United States can dump its waste products into the air or into a body of
water without reprocessing the waste to eliminate pollution. Dumping
practices which were quite widespread only 2 decades ago are rapidly disappearing under rigorous public control and tough legislation. No one yet
knows how much of this regulation might be reasonably described as excessive. Pollution control typically adds to the costs of industrial processes,
and such costs are invariably passed along to consumers. The adversary
process of the courtroom is being employed to develop the essential truths
about the relationship between a clean environment, as defined by statute,
and the cost of achieving it.
The struggle has spawned large numbers of public interest groups
which seek out and identify the major offenders, develop the evidence
against industrial polluters, and eventually bring the cases into court. The
courts have responded by attempting to set well-defined guidelines and
timetables in areas of environmental protection in which the technical
data are not yet fully understood. The law here is quite undeveloped. Antipollution advocates are constantly searching for new problems so that they
might alert the public to the dangers and move in court to protect the
public safety.
The methods used were perfected during the civil rights movement.
They involve a unique combination of legal attack and clever public relations. The mass media are used extensively in order to achieve a favorable
impact on public opinion. The publicity puts great pressure on the businesses charged with environmental carelessness. Hence many of the actions move quickly to a negotiated settlement in order to prevent legislation that might be even more damaging than the negotiated outcome. The
methods are uniquely matched to the achievement of desirable objectives
in a democratic society, and I have nothing but admiration for them.
Moreover, they are very potent. The combination of threatened lawsuits
and reams of publicity hinting that a firm is responsible for injuries or
deaths because of an unreasonable concern for profit has been effective in
bringing industrial polluters to heel.
Much of this legal and public relations apparatus has now been turned
upon the scientific community and upon research on recombinant DNA.
We are seeing the familiar combination of legal pressures and fear-arousal
through hysterical newspaper coverage.
There is no rule of advocacy restricting claims about the potential
dangers of DNA to those which have some basis in scientific reasoning. As
a consequence, dramatic overstatement, innuendo, and purple rhetoric,
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the familiar tools of the adversary process of the courtroom, have combined
virtually to bury the facts concerning DNA in a mass of fear and confusion.
There is a real danger that fearful communities will seek to regulate scientific research at the lowest level of our political governance, where serious
thought and careful analysis are often lacking. The City Council of Cambridge, Massachusetts has already interposed itself as the regulator of
potentially hazardous biological research at Harvard and MIT. The Attorney General of the State of New York and the New York City Council are
considering the same kind of control here. Plainly, these bodies know little
about either the dangers or the subtleties of biological research. Their
approach is a purely political one, responding to the fears of the voters. To
those of us raised in the traditions of academic freedom, the atmosphere
is reminiscent of the days of Galileo and the Inquisition.
If any one in this audience believes that I am myself falling victim to
overstatement and purple rhetoric in hinting of a possible revival of the
Inquisition, let me note that in 1963 Columbia University applied for a
permit to operate a 250-kilowatt Triga nuclear reactor as a training device
for its engineering students. The permit was opposed by community groups
on the ground that the proposed installation constituted a radiation hazard
to the densely populated surrounding area of Morningside Heights. I
should note that 250 kilowatts is much less power than it takes to light the
campus at night. The Triga reactor is a rather simple training device which
has been judged to be completely safe by committees of competent scientists at Columbia and elsewhere, but these considerations did not diminish
public apprehensions that we somehow would be dumping lethal radiation
on our innocent neighbors.
Community opposition initially took the form of intervention in the
University's appliction for a license to operate the research reactor. During
nearly a decade of struggle before hearing and review boards of the Atomic
Energy Commission, the safety issue was studied in a legal record that
eventually accumulated many thousands of pages. Finally, in 1972, the
AEC concluded its hearing procedures and announced its intention to issue
a license. The intervenors promptly took the federal government to court,
with Columbia as an interested bystander. During all this time, the device
remained inoperative. In 1973, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit ruled the Columbia reactor safe and authorized the issuance of a federal license to operate it. The intervenors then brought the
matter to the United States Supreme Court. In 1974 the Court refused to
review the decision of the Second Circuit, and the matter was finally
settled. Columbia was then free at last to obtain a license to operate its
training reactor. The license was issued in 1977.
Now that should end the story-right? Wrong! Following the Supreme
Court's refusal to hear the case, opponents of the Columbia reactor introduced prohibition bills in the New York State Legislature and the New
York City Council. The City Council required that a permit from the
Health Department be obtained. We applied. The permit was denied on
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the basis of the same environmental safety arguments rejected by the court
of appeals. We are now once more back in court, this time side by side with
the Federal Government, arguing that the City's health permit requirement improperly contravenes the federal licensing authority. No doubt
this case too will be appealed up the line to the highest courts, and perhaps
some day a future generation of Columbia students may be able to benefit
from the training available at forty-four such installations in this country
and abroad. The essential point is that we are now in the fifteenth year of
our effort to carry on research and training in nuclear engineering at Columbia, and thus far, although we have won every legal argument, the
reactor remains inoperative. I ask you to consider whether this activity has
been effectively suppressed at Columbia.
The intervenors put forth a list of quasi-scientific arguments calculated to impress lawyers and judges but which leave our scientists baffled.
So-called "expert" academic witnesses were brought into court claiming
that similar nuclear research devices have altered the frequency of birth
defects in surrounding communities elsewhere in the country. Our scientists have studied the data and found them to have no basis. How is one
to judge who is right? Perhaps it is safer to suppress the research in view
of all the opposition, by virtue of the admittedly slim but conceivable
possibility that there may be some real danger. This is what my legislative
friends tell me, but unfortunately, our engineers and physicists have just
as strong a claim to the protections of academic freedom as philosophers
have. Hence, we cannot accept an outcome that is scientifically wrong even
though it may be politically expedient.
I have gone through the development of this case history in some detail
so as to argue that the most probable outcome of the adversary process in
issues involving the safety of scientific research is prolonged suppression
of the research. The conflicting advocacy of the courtroom unfortunately
does not contribute effectively to the understanding of these extremely
subtle scientific questions. The issues are always highly technical, turning
on a level of knowledge and scientific judgment not easily transplanted
from the laboratory. The adversary method for arriving at truth on which
our legal procedures are based is, in simple language, not appropriate for
arriving at sound public policy on scientific matters. Scientific questions
simply cannot be settled by persuasive argument.
The only effective method for resolving safety questions in nuclear or
biological research is the objective analysis of experimental results by our
best scientific minds. It is not a harmonious process by any means, but it
is the only way to arrive at sensible judgments about the meaning of
research findings. What I am saying, in unvarnished simplicity, is that the
use of the adversary legal process to control scientific research is likely to
lead to serious scientific errors and to badly thought-out policy. The protracted denial of an important research tool in nuclear engineering to Columbia's students will not damage the university fatally. We shall manage,
but an extension of the same principle to attempted Public control of
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research in biology, physics, and chemistry would be a destructive policy.
This kind of control should be exercised only in the most extreme circumstances when universities show themselves to be unable to take reasonable
steps on behalf of public safety. Public control is especially worrisome
when it is exercised by district courts or local legislatures responding to
grass root fears or public hysteria.
I want to extend my point one step further. The problems of universities, as they attempt to protect their scientific research from adversary
attacks generated by well-organized community groups playing on the
fears of the general public, are a rather faithful reflection of the problems
of the nation as a whole addressing major public questions which turn on
subtle scientific or technical judgments. America is rapidly exhausting its
supplies of petroleum as our consumption of oil and natural gas continues
to increase under the demands of our standard of living. By 1990, our
dependence on Middle East production should be virtually complete. We
can expect to be in the same position as the Japanese are in now, and
indeed, to be competing with the Japanese, as well as other industrial
nations, for scarce oil. Even today, more than half our consumption is
derived from sources outside the United States. Yet many intelligent people still believe that the oil embargo was contrived in order to produce
profits for American oil companies. It is almost shocking to discover that
half the country still does not believe that we import oil.
To what extent is this astonishing level of misunderstanding and misinformation a reflection of the adversary character of our public life as we
attempt to develop an effective energy policy? If a large number of elected
state attorneys general see the oil companies as conspirators, what is the
general public to believe? Adversary struggle, claim and counterclaim, and
blizzards of publicity from public officials and public interest groups seeking divestiture legislation will not produce new oil. Our people are being
encouraged to believe that it is all a plot, that nuclear energy is dangerous
to life, and that solar energy development is being blocked by monied
interests trying to profit from the oil crisis. As far as I can judge from what
I know of the facts, nearly all of this is the purest form of nonsense. No
competent scientist, oil expert, or solar energy engineer believes that this
adversary rhetoric is solving any of our problems or doing the nation any
good.
The idea that the adversary legal and political struggle characterizing
the environmental protection movement in America during the last decade
may be doing great damage to our scientific and technological capability
is bound to be a very unpopular one, but I fear that it is uncomfortably
close to the mark. And the basic question persists: How are we to find more
responsible ways to make sound public judgments on critical national
issues such as the control of energy, science, and technology?
First, I believe that we must be extremely careful to avoid legislating
American science out of existence under the guise of environmental protection. Legislators must exercise forbearance in responding to the undifferen-
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tiated fears of the general public. They should be willing to ask for the help
and advice of the best people in the scientific community in establishing
the trade-offs between environmental protection and modern technology.
Second, local authorities should be extremely reluctant to intervene
in the administration of research at universities when legal actions are
brought by community advocates claiming public safety violations or environmental damage. The necessary controls can and, indeed, must be established at the national level under the guidance of scientifically competent agencies such as the National Academy of Science or the National
Institutes of Health. Local intervention in the form now developing in
Boston and New York City will only produce chaos. It has the potential
for driving scientific research out of the northeast region of the country,
with all the economic danger to our area that will follow from such irrationality.
Finally, the government and the bench should turn more frequently
to special commissions constituted from the best and most responsible
members of the scientific community in an effort to formulate wise public
policy on the protection of the environment, public health, and on all
major public safety questions. I have heard of proposals that a "science
court" be established for the resolution of disputes in these technically
demanding areas, but I oppose the concept because it introduces courtroom advocacy into a branch of knowledge where advocacy and overstatement becloud issues instead of illuminating them. Prestigious commissions
with high credibility have rendered great service toward the solution of
subtle public questions in Britain. We ought to make more use of the idea
in this country as an effective healing force and as an alternative to overzealous advocacy. The issues are far too complex and too much is at stake
to permit us to destroy our scientific leadership in a welter of adversary
struggles with narrow constituency interests. Such struggles are clearly
avoidable if there is a national will to do so.
And so here we are, 500 years after the birth of Saint Thomas More,
still trying to harmonize the law with justice, still striving for Utopia. The
English system of law managed to survive the caprices of Henry VIII,
eventually becoming the cornerstone upon which America's great legal
traditions were built. For more than 2 centuries, we and our English colleagues have shown the rest of the world how societies can govern themselves through the application of principles rather than through the raw
exercise of authority.i Our legal structure is not perfect. It is natural to
dwell on its imperfections and to consider what remains to be done, as I
have done this evening. But that effort should not divert us from recognizing what Saint Thomas More sought by demanding adherence to a principle from a monarch who viewed his merest whim as the essence of law. The
principles of Anglo-American law continue to illuminate our lives and to
guide our destinies 5 centuries later. It is perhaps the finest contribution
to humanism that man has yet devised, and we must continue to seek its
perfection.

